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In recent decades “responsibility” has become a prominent idea in international 
political discourse. Against this backdrop, international policy and scholarly 
communities contemplating China’s rise regularly address themselves to “whether, 
when, and how” China will become a “responsible” great power. This article reviews, 
unpacks and questions understandings of responsibility in the debates about China. 
One strand of these debates argues that China can become responsible by adopting 
and promoting the existing “status quo”; the other argues that China acts responsibly 
when it challenges the unfair hegemony of the status quo. This article argues that both 
debates operate with remarkably similar understandings of responsibility. Whether 
China adopts existing rules and norms or establishes rules and norms of its own 
responsibility is understood to be rule and norm compliance. The article explores the 
possibility of an alternative understanding of responsibility suggested by Jacques 
Derrida. It is argued that a Derridian approach does not dispense with rules and norms 
but is conscious of the irresolvable dilemma when faced with the demands of multiple 
others. Such an understanding is helpful insofar as it reminds those who would call for 
responsibility that such responsibility, and politics itself, is more than simply following 
rules and maintenance of norms. 
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In recent decades “responsibility” has become an important trope in international 
political discourse. The demands to act in a responsible way range from military 
intervention (e.g. the “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P) to the protection of the 
environment (see Ban Ki-moon’s comments reported in Associated Press, 2012) and 
the responsibility current generations have to future generations and for historical 
injustices. Furthermore, responsibility extends not just to particular actions but also 
points to a relationship with the framework and norms that underpin and authorise 
those actions. Thus, President Donald Trump has called on Russia to “join the 
community of responsible nations” (Wintour, 2017), and to play its role in recognising 
and preserving international norms. 
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Within this context it is regularly asked whether, when and how China will 
become a “responsible power,” “responsible great power,” or “responsible major 
country” (fuzeren de daguo 负责任的大国). It is said that seeking international 
legitimacy as such has become “a defining feature of China’s foreign policy” (Loke, 
2009: 202), and that “international responsibility” has become “one of the most 
significant topics in Chinese International Relations studies over the last decade” 
(Mao Weizhun, 2017: 173). This is reflected in the rhetoric of the Chinese elite. 
President Xi Jinping made responsibility a key theme of his speech to the 2017 World 
Economic Forum, paying special attention to the rules designed to mitigate against 
climate change that were previously agreed upon under the terms of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change: “One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit ... 
All signatories should stick to [the Paris Agreement] instead of walking away from it 
as this is a responsibility we must assume for future generations” (Xi Jinping, 2017).  
 
Yet, despite these calls, literatures also often point out the lack of agreement 
as to what responsibility means in this type of context (e.g. Loke, 2009: 198; Loke, 
2016: 847; Yeophantong, 2013: 329–64). What exactly does it mean for China to 
become “responsible”? Indeed, what does it mean to talk about any state or actor 
becoming responsible? Responding to these questions, this article engages with 
conceptualisations of responsibility that are at work in these debates. Ostensibly, the 
debate about China’s rise appears to be about two contrasting understandings of how 
China can act responsibly. The first claims that China is acting responsibly if it adopts, 
maintains and promotes the “status quo” of the international community. The second 
claims that China acts responsibly when it challenges the unfair rules and norms or 
the status quo and promotes a fairer system. This article argues that the fundamental 
idea of responsibility in these debates is more uniform than it first appears. Both 
positions in the debates agree that as a “major power” China needs to promote peace 
and stability by complying with certain rules and norms. In other words, in these 
debates, responsibility is narrowed to mean rule and norm compliance.  
 
Thus, whilst this article does not intend to make a direct contribution to the 
existing literature on rules and norms, its focus on responsibility as adherence to rules 
and norms brings it into relation with this literature. The role of norms in regulating 
and guiding actors in international relations is now well established, and much work 
now focuses on “how, when and why norms emanate and evolve” (Björkdahl, 2002: 
9). This article is concerned with norms understood in their regulative, evaluative, and 
prescriptive dimensions. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 891) have observed: “It is 
precisely the prescriptive (or evaluative) quality of ‘oughtness’ that sets norms apart 
from other kinds of rules.” Norms, then, are sets of assumptions about what ought to 
happen and why (Katzenstein, 1996: 20). As such, they are necessarily shared 
(Katzenstein, 1996: 21; Jepperson et al., 1996: 54). In essence, norms are a set of 
shared assumptions about what should be done and why. Furthermore, norms 
establish what kinds of actors there can be in a system, and place demands, 
permissions, and prohibitions on those actors (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 468). Thus, in 
Katzenstein’s (1996: 5) words: “In some situations norms operate like rules that define 
the identity of an actor … In other situations norms operate as standards that specify 
the proper enactment of an already defined identity … Norms thus either define (or 
constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, or they do both.” Rules can 
be considered to be articulated and concrete instructions which issue from the 
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attempt to realise norms. The rules of any given system tell actors who must act, when 
they must act, and how they must act. Thus, if norms are the desired destination, then 
the rules and their practices are directions for getting there.  
 
This article reviews, unpacks and questions this understanding of 
responsibility as rule and norm compliance. It draws on the work of Jacques Derrida 
to help to show that responsibility as rule and norm compliance is one understanding 
of responsibility, but not the only one that is possible. This opens space for an 
attendant claim about the location of politics. Existing debates that understand 
responsibility to be a question of rule compliance take China to pose a dilemma 
between competing hegemonic visions. In contrast, a Derridian approach suggests 
that politics and responsibility are concerned with how one responds to others in a 
world where the foundations for action are uncertain, and where attending to the 
welfare of some necessarily means neglecting the welfare of others. The contribution 
of this article is therefore primarily analytical and theoretical. Its aim is to explore the 
role that responsibility is playing in thinking about China, and to open a space for 
thinking about alternative ways of framing responsibility. In so doing, it also raises the 
question about the understanding of politics which stands behind these assumptions. 
The article therefore prepares the ground and provides some tools for those wishing 
to think about the meaning and use of responsibility in a wider way, and in areas 
beyond China, such as R2P, the environment and intergenerational justice. 
 
The rest of this article explores these ideas. First, some conceptual 
clarification is undertaken specifically to explain standard meanings of responsibility 
in the Anglophone and Sinophone traditions. What is found is a striking similarity 
concerning how responsibility is understood (be it explicit or implicit), namely 
responsibility concerns observing rules and norms and playing one’s role within such 
a system. Second, this article illustrates (in two parts) this claim in relation to demands 
that China become a “responsible power.” Both the understanding of China as 
accepting and promoting rules and norms (the “status quo approach”), and the view 
that China can become responsible by challenging these rules and norms, are two 
sides of the same conceptual coin. The last part of the article looks at an alternative 
to this understanding of responsibility by exploring the suggestive ideas of Derrida. It 
is argued that a Derridian approach does not dispense with rules but is conscious of 
the irresolvable dilemma when faced with the demands of multiple others. Such an 
understanding is helpful insofar as it reminds those who would call for responsibility 
that such responsibility, and politics itself, is more than simply following rules and 
maintenance of norms. 
 
Responsibility: Western, Chinese, and Derridian 
 
Responsibility is a comparatively new concept in the West, and somewhat under-
analysed (Williams, 2014). Although instances of the use of “responsibility” can be 
dated from the late 1550s, in English and French the term has a strong connection to 
political events such as the American and French revolutions, and only later (in the 
twentieth century) being more closely connected to metaphysical and moral 
questions concerning agency (cf. Williams, 2014). In terms of its political heritage, 
McKeon explains in detail how responsibility was connected to the idea of 
“responsible government” in the 1800s, and that this notion is an extension of the 
older notion of accountability (McKeon, 1957: 24; for how accountability is now 
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associated with “norms” see Brennan et al., 2013: 37). The Oxford English Dictionary 
(henceforth OED) records the continuing influence of this original context. Here, older 
instances of the term “responsible” are connected to the ability and obligation to pay 
debts or fulfil duties (dating back to the 1500s and 1600s). The OED (2019) also 
records how responsibility is connected to holding an office, role or appointment, and 
to be the cause or originator of something. 
 
The entries in the OED reflect the original political and juridical meaning of 
being responsible, which connects it to holding a role. A juridical understanding of the 
idea can also be seen in the political debates that frame the origin of the term. To be 
responsible is be subject to punishment when infringing the rights of others (McKeon, 
1957; Ricoeur, 2000). However, as Ricoeur (2000: 11–12) has observed, currently 
there is a “proliferation and dispersion of uses of this term.” Significantly, to be 
responsible is both to “answer for” and “to respond to.” This is what is, in part, 
reflected in contemporary thinking about being responsible to/for future generations, 
the environment, and those who suffer poverty, disease, famine, and the 
consequences of war. In the international context this is realised in terms of 
adherence to rules and norms. In other words, the juridical sense of being responsible 
has not been abandoned, even as the notion of responsibility has changed from 
infringing the rights of others to actively promoting their welfare. Furthermore, an 
actor is responsible by virtue of the role that they hold; and that role is not only 
defined by a system or rules and norms, it also places obligations on that actor to 
adhere to those rules and norms. Failure to do so is occasion for imputation (Raffoul, 
2004: 44). 
 
These “European” understandings of responsibility resonate with Chinese 
understandings. Indeed, both Western and Chinese understanding of responsibility 
are remarkably similar. There is a longer Chinese tradition of understanding 
responsibility, which also connects “responsibility” to compliance with some set of 
established and calculable rules and norms. The Chinese term for responsibility in 
these debates, zeren 责任, is made up of characters indicating “duty” (ze 责), and 
positioning in the sense of to “serve in a position” (ren 任 ) (Hanyu da zidian 
weiyuanhui, 1995: 6.3626.3, 1.122.6; Karlgren, 1974 [1923]: 634, 1045, GSR67f; 
Wieger, 1965 [1915]: 82c). The etymology and pictographic makeup of the characters 
associate them with money (through the radical 贝  in the lower part of ze), 
indebtedness and the duties that come with a particular position. This etymology and 
pictographic make-up thereby points towards an understanding of zeren as 
something calculable and contractual. Further association with blame and 
punishment sits in parallel with English language use in terms of accountability in 
relation to such calculable duties or rules (Williams, 2014). This, then, is the general 
picture which underpins both the view that supports, and the view that seeks to 
replace, the status quo. In both accounts, acting responsibly means identifying rules 
concerning what one should do, and then following those rules. 
 
However, a different, albeit related, use of responsibility in the Chinese 
tradition conceptualises it not as a duty, but as a virtue. This is the usage that has 
received the least attention in the discipline of philosophy, dominated by a Western 
tradition of thought (Williams, 2014). Nevertheless, virtue is clearly important in the 
Chinese philosophical tradition of understanding zeren and many current 
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exceptionalist claims about Chinese responsibility draw on this understanding of 
zeren. The character ren 任 depicts a person (人) and a pole supported in the middle 
with an object attached at each end (壬). It indicates the burden of carrying something 
on one’s shoulders and emphasises the importance of people to responsibility (Hanyu 
da zidian weiyuanhui, 1995: 1.122.6; Karlgren, 1974 [1923]: 634, GSR67f; Wieger, 
1965 [1915]: 82c). Perhaps responsibility, then, is not only a question of living up to 
some set and calculable norms or rules that one is duty-bound to perform based on 
one’s position. Responsibility can also be understood as a virtue concerned with the 
demands and burdens that being with other people places on us in terms of virtues, 
morals, or ethics beyond rules. Although these ideas find support in Chinese history 
and etymology, this understanding of responsibility has not been given enough room 
in the debates over China as a responsible power. 
 
In this discussion about the meaning of responsibility the Derrida’s thought 
provides some resources to develop an alternative perspective and understanding. 
Derrida’s account offers a view of responsibility which explicitly opposes 
“responsibility” to the obedience to rules. Simply put, by obeying rules one is not 
making any decision about what is an appropriate course of action, as that decision 
has already been made. This does not mean that Derrida is advocating the 
abandonment of rules (Peterson, 1997: 288); it does however mean that the moment 
of responsibility comes before and after any given action (Peterson, 1997: 288), and 
outside of any rules and norms. Furthermore, whereas adherence to rules and norms 
would seem to imply that the “right thing” can be done, Derrida’s view understands 
responsibility to be made conceivable by an irresolvable form of dilemma. In acting, 
one can never know what is right. Derrida is not merely concerned that some rules 
may contradict other rules – such a dilemma could be resolved if it were possible to 
construct a consistent set of rules. Nor is he concerned with finding a way to know 
that the norms that underpin the rules are the correct ones. Derrida’s key concern is 
that there is simply no way to choose between the foundations for sets of rules – 
indeed, Derrida doubts the existence of any such foundations. Thus, responsibility is 
marked by an irresolvable dilemma not because one must choose between two 
equally valid rules, nor because one cannot be certain of the basis of those rules, but 
because responsibility is a recognition of the unjustness of any decision. There are no 
solid foundations for making a decision about whose call for help is responded to, and 
in helping some there are always others who are not helped. 
 
This leads to the final suggestion. Derrida’s notion of responsibility opens a 
path to understanding how responsibility is – and must be – political. Given that 
politics involves plural others, in attending to the needs of some inevitably, 
necessarily, the needs of others are neglected. Sometimes duties will be exclusionary 
of each other. In such a situation, to perform any duties at all, one must decide which 
“other” will be responded to. By linking responsibility to the undecidable decision, 
Derrida does not conceive of responsibility in relation to a technology or legislation of 
politics, but to a politics which is understood to be focused on the encounter with the 
other. Thus, Derrida’s deconstruction of the concept helps understand China’s rise in 
a more nuanced way and reemphasises the politics of its ethico-political decisions as 
a responsible power. Thus, politics is not about the power-play between sets of rules 
backed by aspiring hegemons but about the very choices involved in setting rules and 
responding to others in conditions of uncertainty. 
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China as Responsible Power, Part 1: Maintenance of the Status Quo 
 
In this and the next section the article considers how understandings of responsibility 
have been articulated by politicians and thinkers in relation to Chinese foreign affairs. 
Renewed interest in China’s “great power responsibility” emerged after 2005, when 
Robert Zoellick (then US deputy secretary of state), called on China to become a 
“responsible stakeholder” by sustaining and strengthening “the international system 
that has enabled its success” (Zoellick, 2005: 94, 98). Such responsibility would see 
China adjusting “to the international rules developed over the last century” (Zoellick, 
2005: 94). Zoellick’s speech explicitly connected responsibility to maintenance of the 
status quo. To be responsible meant recognising and adhering to established norms. 
It also placed an obligation on China to protect and develop such norms. China’s 
“responsibility” was to accept existing norms and find its relevant place in the status 
quo; failure to do so would cast China as irresponsible and a threat. 
 
Zoellick’s speech expresses what is more than a decade later a commonplace 
view of Chinese responsibility. His connection between responsibility and norms has 
been most visible when China is criticised for failing to act in accordance with norms 
and values which are considered “absolute.” Chief amongst these are the protection 
of human rights and the prevention of genocide. Two examples illustrate this. First, 
China has been accused of irresponsibly assisting genocide in Darfur through 
providing loans, weapons, and military training to the government regime. For 
example, Nicholas D. Kristof asked, in the New York Times, “whether China’s rise will 
be accompanied by increasingly responsible behavior in its international relations.” 
“Darfur is a test,” he added, “and for now China is failing” (Kristof, 2006). Second, in 
2012, a UN Security Council resolution calling on Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to 
resign was vetoed by China and Russia. Then British foreign secretary William Hague’s 
comment reflected the views of many state leaders: “Russia and China will be held 
responsible for this terrible situation … They didn’t cause the situation, but they are 
standing in the way of the Security Council” (BBC, 2012b). 
 
When China (together with a number of authoritarian states) voted against a 
later resolution these sentiments were reiterated in the English-language press. The 
Atlantic argued that “Beijing’s support for pariah states is undermining its goal of 
becoming a responsible global player” (Piekos, 2012). In both cases, the PRC was 
accused of being irresponsible, because it broke what were thought of as norms of 
the international system. As a result, scholar Yong Deng has negatively labelled China 
a “post-responsible” power that irresponsibly challenges the rules and norms of the 
status quo (Yong Deng, 2014: 118).   
 
China has also been accused of failing to act responsibly by not doing more to 
promote international norms. On this view, acting responsibly is something more than 
simply not acting irresponsibly. It involves the active acceptance and promotion of 
obligations, burdens, and duties. For example, the higher level of responsibility 
required by the UN for members of the Security Council has resulted in some 
criticising China for remaining detached from its responsibilities as a council member 
after joining it in the 1970s. The apparent shift in later years to increasingly 
constructive contributions to the decision-making process has also been praised as 
China “stepping up to its responsibilities.” Likewise, Chinese support at the 2005 UN 
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World Summit for the adoption of “responsibility to protect” as a “guiding principle” 
has been lauded as indicating a more “responsible” China (for a discussion on China's 
shifting attitude to R2P see Teitt, 2011). Such a China acts responsibly by accepting 
existing international norms and its appropriate role in developing rules from those 
norms. 
Clearly China has its role to play – but this does not mean that all roles are 
equivalent. States play different roles depending on their position and capabilities, 
and responsibility is differentiated. This has led some to claim that China acts 
responsibly when it recognises and fulfils its role in the status quo. Advocates of the 
“China responsibility” thesis (Zhongguo zeren lun 中国责任论) sensitive to context 
and emphasise the need for the PRC to rethink its national interest in light of its rise 
(Yeophantong, 2013: 348). This is a question of recognising and fulfilling various 
criteria that would indicate responsibility. Such “responsibility requirements” (zeren 
xuqiu 责任需求) have been outlined by Wang Yizhou (1999), and separately by Xia 
Liping, who lists a number of “criteria of [a] responsible power” (Xia Liping, 2001: 17). 
This line of reasoning resonates in a number of concepts deployed in the debates over 
Chinese international responsibility, including China’s “self-positioning” (ziwo dingwei 
自我定位) and “international responsibility positioning” (guoji zeren dingwei 国际责
任定位), that all tie the responsibility a particular actor should take to its 
position (dingwei 定位) in the international system (Chan 2006, 15–16; Wang 
Yizhou, 1999; Xiao Huanrong, 2003: 48–49). The idea of what kind of things 
should be taken responsibility for appears uncontested – it is just a question 
of who is in an appropriate position to do what. The key task becomes a question 
of establishing the allocation of duties; and these duties depend on the norms of the 
status quo. This is also reflected in Xiao Huanrong’s analysis of three different 
power positions in international society, each of which corresponds to a different 
set of responsibilities. In Xiao’s scheme a superpower’s local responsibility is to 
strengthen wealth and security, its regional responsibility to acquire spheres of 
influence, and its global responsibility to take charge of international order (Xiao 
Huanrong, 2003: 48; for a discussion see Yeophantong, 2013: 351). The question, 
then, becomes one of whether China is a “superpower.” If it is, then it should take on 
the responsibilities attributed to this status, which means accepting the established 
norms of international society. If it is not, then it can act responsibly by recognising 
this and fulfilling the duties that its position dictates. 
Notions of differentiated responsibility feed into the view that China can best 
discharge its responsibility in international affairs by focusing on its own stability 
and development. On this view, China’s responsibility is a kind of “self-
responsibility” (Shih Chih-yu and Huang Chiung-Chiu, 2013: 351). This thesis 
contrasts with the idea that China needs to take on external responsibilities that 
come with great-power status (for example Hu Liping, 2002: 121–23; Liang Shoude, 
1997: 1–9; Yu Xintian, 2006: 102–14). On this logic of self-responsibility, Shih Chih-yu 
and Huang Chiung-Chiu argue that 
China is neither culturally nor politically prepared to be effectively involved 
in global governance. In their recurring pledge that China will be a 
“responsible major country” … effective self-governance is how the Beijing 
authorities currently believe China should contribute to global governance 
(Shih Chih-yu and Huang Chiung-Chiu, 2013: 352; cf. Xi Jinping’s rhetoric in 
Wenweipo, 2009). 




In other words, China’s self-responsibility is international responsibility (Ren Xiao, 
2007: 27, cited in Zhu Liqun, 2010: 42; Shih Chih-yu and Huang Chiung-Chiu, 2013: 
365; Yeophantong, 2013: 357; see also Hua Jian, 2011: 43). In this way, the PRC 
government has emphasised how it will not challenge the status quo, so that China 
will never be a threat to anyone (see BBC, 2012a; Qin Jize, 2007). Thus, whilst it might 
be claimed that China’s alleged fragility prevents it from taking an overt role in 
international leadership and thus assuming responsibility (Shih Chih-yu and Huang 
Chiung-Chiu, 2013; Shambaugh, 2011), some interpret this as a strategy of strength 
based on a Chinese disposition to cooperation. 
 
From this perspective then, China is cast as responsible or irresponsible 
depending on how closely it is perceived to adhere to play an appropriate role in the 
maintenance and realisation of the rules and norms of the existing status quo. In other 
words, China is expected to assume its differentiated role on the world stage and work 
in cooperation with other states to ensure the smooth running of the international 
system. According to this view, China knows what is expected of it, and when it fails 
to meet these expectations it can be said to be acting “irresponsibly.” Furthermore, 
where China does act “irresponsibly” by failing to act to meet given norms (or by 
blocking others from ensuring that they are maintained) then it is said to carry some 
culpability for the ensuring disorder and infraction of those norms.  
 
China as Responsible Power, Part 2: An Alternative to the Status Quo 
 
The previous section highlighted commentary which understands China to act 
responsibly if and when it adheres to established rules and norms. In contrast, there 
is an alternative line of argument which claims China acts responsibly when it 
challenges the status quo and tries to establish an alternative – and fairer – set of 
rules and norms. This idea has a clear precedent in foreign policy of the Mao Zedong 
era, in which China explicitly aimed to export revolution (see Yeophantong, 2013: 
340–42). This position is exemplified by Beijing-based think tank analyst Yuan Peng’s 
declaration that “China, for its part, does not base its notion of international 
responsibility on U.S. expectations” (quoted in Hachigian and Yuan Peng, 2010: 82).  
 
The accounts discussed in this section portray a Chinese state and civilization 
whose responsibility it is not to maintain, but to challenge and change, the current 
world order, and replace it with a better one. However, these accounts fall back on 
the same understanding of responsibility that has been seen in the approaches they 
wish to challenge. In these alternative literatures, responsibility is still understood as 
upholding a set of norms and rules, it is just that these norms are said to be Chinese 
rather than Western. At the same time, the “Chinese” norms are also said to be 
universal and good for everybody. Like in the so-called Western discourses that they 
criticise, the norms being advocated are said to be understood by a group which can 
represent others – it is just that “international society” has been replaced by a set of 
elites with distinctly Chinese characteristics. 
 
In this strand of literature, the notion of the status quo is often tightly bound 
up with ideas of immoral and selfish American leadership (although such accusations 
have been levelled from different parts of the globe, for numerous reasons, and for a 
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long time; see Bull, 1979; Dumbrell, 2002: 279). Nevertheless, the claim is 
exceptionally persistent as a core part of contemporary Chinese international 
relations scholarship and forms the backdrop against which arguments about a better 
Chinese alternative are formulated. Some scholars argue that “Chinese assertions of 
responsibility differ significantly from the so-called ‘China responsibility’ claim 
currently advocated by Western leaders and scholars, a claim whose primary 
motivation appears to be restraint and regulation imposed by Western powers” 
(Wang, 2013: 523). To these thinkers, the “China responsibility” thesis is just another 
version of the purported “China threat” thesis, designed by a self-interested West to 
limit Chinese autonomy (Ma Zhengang, 2007: 5–12; cf. Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Geng Shuang in Reuters, 2017a).  
 
In other areas the Chinese state’s approach to intervention in cases like Darfur 
and Syria are said to be guided by its aspiration to “play the role, and cultivate an 
image, of a ‘responsible great power’” (Lee, Chan, and Chan, 2012: 436). However, 
responsibility in these cases was long understood in China as standing up against rules 
like R2P. Although China was part of adopting the R2P norm at the UN World Summit 
meeting in 2005, senior Chinese officials have advocated the notion of “responsible 
protection” as a Chinese way of contributing to the building of a new and just 
international political order (Ruan Zongze, 2012: 41). For example, with regards to 
debates over the application of R2P in Syria, Chinese government representatives 
used the resolutions passed by the UN in 2013 and 2014 and their opposition to the 
three resolutions that had preceded them to claim that they were acting as a 
responsible power (Niu Xiaolei, 2014). Then assistant foreign minister Le Yucheng 
explained: “Being responsible means keeping to principles and saying ‘no’ to what is 
wrong … what we need is not just ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ but also ‘responsible 
protection’” (Xinhua, 2012). The Chinese media defended Chinese opposition to 
Western interventionism by portraying its supporters as the irresponsible ones. 
Claiming that the West used wars to distract its public, Li Qingsi (2012) wrote in China 
Daily: 
 
In fact it is the West’s support … of the Syrian opposition that has led to the 
prolonged violent unrest in Syria ... As a responsible power, China, in addition 
to diplomatic mediation, should formulate more practical strategies to 
respond to Western power practices. 
 
Since then, China has affirmed its position by vetoing Security Council resolutions 
about Syria (Reuters, 2017b). On this line of thinking, the implementation of rules of 
the current system (such as the R2P) are thus bound-up with Western, particularly 
American, self-interest. This represents the “wrong” in opposition to which China is 
portrayed as responsibly insisting on some other principles. An indication of what 
these principles are is gained by looking both to what the Chinese political leadership 
says. Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream” slogan sometimes appears to be deployed in a 
more universalist “win-win” sense, for example when Xi said to President Barack 
Obama that the “Chinese Dream” incorporates the “American Dream” (Zhonggong 
zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 2013: 3, cited in Callahan, 2014b). Yet as part of a more 
exceptionalist logic Xi also deploys the Chinese Dream rhetoric in a more 
confrontational manner, stressing that China is a socialist alternative to the liberal 
capitalist US-led world order (Callahan, 2014b). Chinese scholars have also portrayed 
the relation between the Chinese Dream and the American Dream in terms of a 
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contest of opposing values (Hu Shuli, 2013; cf. the discussion of the Chinese and 
American dreams in Callhan, 2014a). 
Whilst government rhetoric is (intentionally) vague about the specifics of its 
morals and ethics, a somewhat more detailed idea of what principles are involved in 
the Chinese “alternative” can be constructed by looking at academic discourse. 
Emerging in conjunction with the government rhetoric of “harmonious world” and the 
Chinese Dream, but drawing on a legacy of Chinese thought that goes back much 
further, a growing body of literature is developing that has been described as 
“harmonist discourses that aim to challenge Western hegemonic discourses and 
create a new system of governance” (Son, 2012: 400). Going further than most of the 
discussions of concepts such as “The Beijing Consensus,” “The Chinese Way,” “The 
Chinese Experience,” or “The China Model,” the harmonist discourses continue “to a 
rather explicit questioning of the very ‘constitutional structures’ that are the core of 
the international system” (Carlson, 2010: 96). These are fundamental norms of the 
“international order” (Reus-Smit, 1999: 14, cited in Carlson 2010, 95; cf. Breslin, 
2011). The harmonist discourses appeal to China’s history and culture, and its 
allegedly superior moral standards that set it apart from the West (Wang, 2013: 525; 
see also Shi Yinhong, 2009: 5–8). 
One influential attempt to articulate these alternative Chinese rules and 
norms of responsibility can be seen in Yan Xuetong’s theorisation of “hegemonic 
power” and “humane authority.” Yan explicitly identifies China’s top strategic interest 
to be the establishment of a “new world order” (Yan Xuetong, 2014: 163) or “new 
international norms” (Yan Xuetong, 2013: 217, 231). He understands the claims to 
responsibility, as well as accusations of irresponsibility, to be a significant factor 
shaping contemporary foreign policy behaviour in China, most recently the shift under 
Xi’s Chinese Dream from “keeping a low profile” to “striving for achievement” (Yan 
Xuetong, 2014: 4, 31; see also 2013: 232). For Yan, the current international system 
was constructed by egocentric hegemons, and especially the US (Yan Xuetong, 1999). 
The US exemplifies a kind of bad world leader that Yan encapsulates in the Chinese 
concept ba 霸 or badao 霸道, which is translated as “hegemony” or “hegemon” (e.g. 
Yan Xuetong, 2008: 136, 137; 2011, ix, 71), or sometimes as “lord protector” (Yan 
Xuetong, 2008: 136). Ba represents the bad and irresponsible leadership against 
which the advocated good and responsible Chinese leadership can be contrasted.  
To Yan, China’s pre-Qin dynasty thinkers distinguished between ba-style 
power, based mostly on (irresponsible) military and economic force, and wang王 -
style authority, based primarily on (responsible) legitimacy and trust. Although Yan 
argues for an overhaul of international institutions he also taps into the same notion 
of a “differentiated responsibility system” that maintainers of the status quo also 
promote (Yan Xuetong, 2013 [2011]: 14–15). Nevertheless, for Yan China should 
compete with the US for responsibility and establish alternative norms (for example 
Yan Xuetong, 2010: 290). China can establish new international norms in opposition 
to liberalism that aim to “transcend” it (Yan Xuetong, 2013: 233). Furthermore, these 
are popular concepts in the literatures on responsibility and on Chinese international 
relations more generally. Wider literatures that discuss China’s idea of a “harmonious 
world” typically contrast it with hegemonism (baquan zhuyi 霸权主义), harmony 
theory with hegemonic stability theory, or hegemonic security (baquan anquan 霸权
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安全), and Chinese harmonious nationalism with US nationalism as hegemonism (cf. 
Nordin, 2015: 2016a). All tend to follow the structure that sees responsibility as being 
linked to the adherence to norms; the only question is which – or whose – norms. 
Another influential example of this line of argument is Zhao Tingyang’s 
elaboration of the concept of Tianxia 天下 (Zhao Tingyang, 2005, 2006, 2009; for an 
example of such influence see Li Baojun and Li Zhiyong, 2008: 84; for critiques see 
Callahan, 2008; Barabantseva, 2009; and Nordin 2016a, 2016b). Tianxia 
literally translates as “All-under-heaven,” but can be variously rendered as “the 
world” or “empire.” It develops ancient Chinese ideas of world order that were 
supposed to operate more through attraction than coercion. The idea of 
responsible Tianxia is conceptualised in direct opposition to the international state 
system and in particular “America’s disastrous leadership in the world” (Zhao 
Tingyang, 2009: 6). Zhao maintains that Tianxia is “completely different from 
Western civilisation” and based on a Chinese understanding of inclusivity (Zhou 
Jianming and Jiao Shixin, 2008: 28). What is needed is a “view from nowhere” (Zhao 
Tingyang, 2003) which will enable us to “take responsibility for the world as our own 
responsibility” (Zhao Tingyang, 2005, as translated in Callahan, 2007: 18, and cited 
in Yeophantong, 2013: 360; see also Zhao Tingyang, 2014). For this to happen 
contradictions need to be overcome, by turning “the enemy into a friend” and 
transforming “the bad into the good” through a voluntary process where others 
emulate the superior Chinese values (Zhao Tingyang, 2006: 34, 36). 
The “good” to which all should conform is explicitly arrived at in an anti-
democratic manner by both Yan, Zhao, and a majority of scholars that adopt this 
“alternative Chinese” approach to responsibility. In this line of thought, which is often 
referred to in the literatures on Chinese responsibility (including Loke, 2009: 203; 
Yeophantong, 2013), harmonious relationships were traditionally hierarchical 
relationships. In such a framework, everybody assumed their proper place as well as 
the responsibilities and duties particular to that position. In the contemporary 
literatures on responsibility, the responsibility of the ruler is to lead by virtuous 
example (Yan Xuetong, 2011: 68). The responsibility of those in an inferior position is 
to follow and obey (see Yeophantong, 2013: 335 ff.). In this manner, both Yan and 
Zhao imagine responsibility as compliance with a set of norms that are in some form 
supposed to be universal. Behaving “responsibly” involves “acting in accordance with 
both the formal and informal rules governing society and its institutions” 
(Yeophantong, 2013: 334). The difference here is that the rules and norms against 
which responsibility is measured are those agreed on by a different society to that of 
the West; a society shaped by the Chinese elites that properly understand how to 
govern All-under-heaven through humane authority. The standard bearer for 
measuring responsibility may thus be different to that of current status quo 
maintenance, but the basic idea of responsibility that underpins it is the same: one is 
responsible if one knows, promotes and protects the rules and norms that order the 
system and define and dictate one’s role. 
Deconstructing Responsibility 
In what remains of this article, a space is opened for an alternative understanding of 
responsibility – an understanding which this article suggests connects responsibility 
to politics not simply as the implementation of a programme of rules, but as a 
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recognition of intersubjectivity with an emphasis on responding to others (cf. Slater, 
1997: 68). This approach has similarities with accounts that draw on ancient Chinese 
thought to emphasise how responsibility is concerned with relating to those who are 
different, or “other,” to ourselves. Thus, thinkers such as Zhao might welcome the 
(re)emphasis on relationships that has been brought to elaborations of responsibility 
by thinkers such as Derrida. Derrida’s notion of responsibility can help understand the 
role of China in world politics, and world politics more generally. Derrida claims that 
responsibility is formed in relation to others who call on us to act responsibly towards 
them. However, situations where we are called upon to act responsibly – where China 
is called upon to act responsibly – are almost always characterised by the presence of 
a number of demands and the impossibility of satisfying them all. In other words, 
situations are rarely presented where one course of action can lead to only good 
outcomes for everybody. Two examples can be used to illustrate this. China’s aid 
programmes and especially the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and China’s potential 
role in R2P. 
 
The BRI has been seen by many as an effort by the Xi leadership to implement 
his understanding of China as a responsible great power, by “striving for 
achievement” on the international stage, rather than biding one’s time. This effort has 
involved shift to a more active role in rolling out a system of trade, connectivity and 
cultural exchange under clear Chinese leadership. Domestic debate in China is divided 
over the extent to which the BRI constitutes an effort to strengthen and improve on 
the existing international system, or alternatively embodies Xi’s efforts to articulate 
and alternative set of rules and norms that can grow into a challenge to that status 
quo. As such, these debates carry on previous domestic debate over China’s aid 
programmes and other overseas undertakings. Most notably for our argument at this 
point of the paper, previous domestic controversy has been heightened in debates 
around the BRI. Advocates of the BRI suggest that it shows China taking on 
international responsibility and demonstrating its status as a “responsible great 
power” by enabling development beyond its own borders. At the same time, critics 
fear that a massive programme of investment abroad comes at the expense of poor 
Chinese citizens and underdeveloped regions at home. In other words, through the 
BRI the Xi government is seen by some to shoulder more responsibility for 
international development and world order, but in doing so to act irresponsibly 
towards China’s poor. As such, these debates arguably illustrate a common dilemma 
in Chinese foreign affairs, of choosing between responding to different “others” at the 
expense of “other others.” Needless to say, such a dilemma is not unique to Chinese 
foreign relations. 
 
In the case of Syria and R2P, China is called upon by others who demand its 
protection. However, the response to this call cannot be one of either protecting or 
not protecting. If UN forces intervene in Syria people will die because of the violence 
authorised by the rules of R2P, because of the actions of those the UN is fighting, and 
as an “unintended consequence” of this (such as through the disruption of aid 
conveys, devastated infrastructure, and so on). If UN forces do not intervene in Syria, 
people will also die. If what China is called upon to do in the evocations of 
“responsibility” under R2P is protect people from death, then China will inevitably fail 
in this “responsibility.” If it responds by protecting some lives, it is neglecting its 
responsibility to protect the other lives that may be taken in the process. 
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Furthermore, resources committed in Syria cannot be committed elsewhere, Darfur 
for example. “This,” as Maja Zehfuss puts it, “is a constant problem: To whose call do 
we respond? And whom do we end up ignoring?” (Zehfuss, 2009: 146). 
 
It is the impossibility of resolving this dilemma that rests at the heart of 
Derrida’s account of responsibility. In Derrida’s (1995a: 68) words, “I cannot respond 
to … another without sacrificing the other other, the other others.” Thus, an aporia is 
reached where there is no way forward, the path is blocked (Derrida, 2006: 63). This 
aporia is a paradox that lies at the heart of the very idea of responsibility: 
 
As soon as I enter into a relation with the other … I know that I can respond 
only by sacrificing ethics, that is, by sacrificing whatever obliges me also to 
respond, in the same way, in the same instant, to all the others (Derrida, 
1995a: 68). 
 
If Derrida is right, and it is simply not possible to respond responsibly and ethically to 
everyone all the time, then the ethics of international responsibility cannot be 
understood in terms of doing good rather than bad. It is important to note that in this 
characterisation of responsibility the “responsible” subject is not responsible by virtue 
of any action that they have taken, or not taken. It thus departs, radically, from older 
meanings of responsibility which connected it to infringement of the rights of others, 
or the failure to perform prescribed actions. Whilst not necessarily choosing a given 
situation, nevertheless Derrida maintains that we are responsible for it. On this view, 
responsibility does not begin when we have chosen our conditions, or when we can 
easily apply moral rules. Derridian responsibility is nothing to do with owing a debt 
because of our past actions or omissions. Responsibility begins with an encounter with 
the other in situations that neither of us “choose.”  
 
A positive ethical outcome, accordingly, cannot be reduced to China’s 
internalisation of, and compliance with, the purported rules and norms of 
international society, as Loke and others would have it (Loke, 2009: 2016). Instead, 
the question of ethics or justice arises precisely in the experience of aporia, “moments 
in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule” (Derrida, 
1992a: 16). This means that we need to make a decision – that Chinese people or 
authorities need to make a decision – in the context of profound uncertainty about 
what is the right thing to do (Derrida, 1995b: 273; Derrida, 2003: 118). Derrida’s point 
is deceptively simple, but it runs counter to the account that prioritises following 
rules. If the path is clear, rules and norms mean that the correct course of action is 
obvious, then it makes no sense at all to speak of “responsibility.” If what China (or 
some other actor) needs to do is pre-ordained there is no need to make a decision – 
the actor need only apply the rules or implement the programme. It might be said 
that this attitude is the ultimate irresponsibility, a pretence that there is no real 
choice, no contradictory demands, no uncertainty. Generalised rules of “justice” or 
“ethics” inevitably fail to do justice to the singularity of an event. Therefore, “far from 
ensuring responsibility, the generality of ethics [as conventionally understood] incites 
irresponsibility” (Derrida, 1995a: 61). It also eschews politics which is predicated not 
on certainty but uncertainty, and the encounter with others rather than the 
compliance with rules. 
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It is difficult to do what Derrida asks: to both respond to the other and to 
recognise that such a response has no foundation or certainty, and simultaneously 
fails to respond to the “other others” (Derrida, 1992b: 79). It is difficult to accept that 
knowledge, calculation and rules will not guarantee justice, ethics, or responsibility. 
Certainly, we should contemplate principles and try to be as informed as we can, but 
ultimately knowledge and principles are not enough and cannot provide us with the 
“responsible” choice (cf. Zehfuss, 2007). Importantly, as E. Jeffrey Popke (2003: 307) 
puts it, “to assert that the decision is ultimately undecidable does not mean that there 
can be no such thing as truth, right or good. It means, rather, that if we purport to 
know in advance the specific content of such notions, then the event of the decision 
is divested of its political content,” as though it was deduced by a calculating machine 
(Derrida, 1999: 240). Such a machine follows the rules it has been set. A part of the 
political condition is realising that we establish norms and set rules without 
foundations. This does not mean we can never act and never order our collective 
world, but it does mean that all action is provisional and necessarily fails to respond 
to all the calls upon us. Responsibility “affirms the necessity to judge, to analyze, to 
make decisions, in the context of an event that is conditioned by our inexhaustible 
responsibility to the other” (Popke, 2003: 307; see also Derrida, 1997: 18). Such a 
judgement and decision in response to the other is political. Thus, an important point 
about this decision is that we are not somehow isolated and autonomous in our 
decision making. Rather, when we respond to the world around us, to others, that 
world and those others are profoundly implicated in our decision, to the point where 
Derrida writes of “the Other’s decision in me, or through me” (Derrida, 2006: 103). In 
this sense, the decisions that China makes in response to others’ demands are not 
simply or straightforwardly under China’s control. We could even say – to Xia Liping’s 




From the debates reviewed in this article, it is clear that there is a diversity of opinion 
in existing discussions on China as a responsible power. Some understand China’s 
duties in absolute terms, whereas others focus on their distribution based on relative 
power and position. Some describe or even advocate an inward-looking attitude to 
responsibility, whereas others argue China can and will be more outwardly proactive. 
It has been shown how the debates on Chinese responsibility are cast in terms of a 
dichotomisation of change and continuity, where “responsible great power” 
behaviour means to either support or resist the rules and norms that uphold the 
current international system. As a result, actors in the West and US have often been 
highly critical of what is understood as Chinese irresponsibility. China is 
“irresponsible” because it should recognise the existing rules and norms, and it is 
capable of following them – but it chooses not to.  
 
This article has argued that both the revisionist and the status quo strands of 
responsibility thought, that point to one another as irresponsible, can be criticised for 
a similar politics of domination, imperialism or hegemonism. Both fall back on an 
understanding of responsibility as the compliance with some set of rules and norms 
that are supposed to be universal or agreed upon in society. In one case they tend to 
refer to “international society,” (a euphemism for Western elites); in the other case 
they tend to refer to the “humane authority” of Tianxia (a euphemism for Chinese 
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elites). Both arguments fall back on the same underlying notion of responsibility as 
“acting in accordance with both the formal and informal rules governing society and 
its institutions” (Yeophantong, 2013: 334). Large portions of both strands of literature 
also fall back on a notion of differentiated responsibility, where appropriate 
responsibility can be judged and described in advance by accurately measuring the 
PRC’s capabilities and position. Once one has accurate information about these 
capabilities, one will be able to refer to principles that can indicate what precise 
actions would constitute appropriately responsible behaviour. 
 
In relation to such dominant notions of responsibility, this article has 
suggested entertaining a different understanding. Drawing on the thought of Derrida, 
a construction of responsibility that sees it as the opposite of compliance with 
established rules and norms has been developed. On this view it only makes sense to 
speak of responsibility in the context of radical uncertainty. An “ethics of international 
responsibility,” to pursue Loke’s term, needs to acknowledge the undecidable nature 
of the choices China faces, or else it falls back into irresponsibility. Yeophantong 
(2013: 364) concludes her investigation of the historical evolution of responsibility in 
China by arguing that “tensions undeniably surface between Chinese and Western 
conceptions of responsibility and corresponding approaches to global governance, as 
well as between domestic and international understandings.” These tensions revolve 
around what is to be done by whom. It can be added that tensions equally undeniably 
surface between different Western concepts, and between different Chinese 
concepts. Different systems offer different priorities; different systems respond to 
some and neglect others. However, such tensions should not be understood as 
something that makes responsibility impossible. Rather, it is precisely these tensions 
that point to the deeper idea of responsibility: that we must always act without 
ultimate justification, and in choosing some we neglect others.  
 
What are the effects of thinking through a Derridean understanding of 
responsibility? In contrast to the view that responsibility is about rule compliance, the 
possibility of making simple and categorical judgements of right and wrong is lost. 
Lost, too, is the possibility of a stable knowledge of what constitutes responsible 
behaviour. Even the possibility of being responsible in a complete and absolute sense 
is lost. What is gained is perhaps the possibility of being responsible at all (rather than 
executing a programme which in effect has nothing to do with responsibility). 
Arguably, also regained is the politics of speaking of China as a responsible power. As 
Zehfuss puts it, “the aporia of the undecidable does not make responsibility 
impossible; depoliticisation, which turns ethical questions into technical problems 
awaiting technical solutions determined by pre-given rules, does” (Zehfuss, 2009: 147, 
with reference to Derrida, 1992b: 71–2). In Chinese assessments of whose demand is 
urgent to respond to, there is also a new need for political commitment. As Derrida 
might put it: 
 
For such assessment, there is, by definition, no pre-existing criterion or 
absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, 
without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on 
the condition constituted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, 
decision and political responsibility – repoliticization (Derrida, 1999: 240, 
emphasis in original). 
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Perhaps a different way of approaching the notion of China as a responsible power is 
then to steer away from the exclusive focus on established rules and norms as a 
standard-bearer for measuring such responsibility. The attempt to eliminate the 
radical undecidability, the aporia, from China’s decisions about what kind of power to 
be is precisely what eliminates responsibility itself. If responsibility is to be possible, 
the aporia must remain (Derrida, 1995a: 66). Indeed, it does remain, and denying it is 
a refusal of the responsibility that recognising it would place on all states including 
China. Denying responsibility by equating it to following rules is also an eschewing the 
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